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Procedural and Substantive Fairness in
Sentencing: An Unnecessarily
Unappealing Subject to Pennsylvania
Higher Courts
I. Introduction
Sentencing has been depicted as the "most complex and difficult
function a jurist [can be] called upon to perform."' Yet it is this decision-
al process that receives the least scrutiny from appellate courts. While
higher tribunals routinely interfere with the trial court's exercise of
discretion in civil matters when only money is at stake, they are reluctant
to probe the propriety of criminal sentences when liberty and perhaps
even life are imperiled.2 Thus, since most defendants who reach the trial
stage choose to plead guilty,3 their fate rests almost entirely in the hands
of the trial judge.
Control of this untrammeled discretion is essential to purge a penal
system of irrational4 and disparate5 sentences. Unfortunately sentence
review in Pennsylvania has until recently a been limited almost exclu-
sively to the delineation of requirements for procedural fairness. While
this usually assures that the sentencing jurist has an adequate information-
al basis for the imposition of a sentence, it fails to answer certain
important questions: "[F]rom what point of view are these facts and
circumstances to be marshaled? What is the objective to be reached?''6
I. Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 136, 351 A.2d 650, 659 (1976) (Nix, J.,
dissenting).
2. Commonwealth v. Riggins, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 32, 43, 332 A.2d 521, 527 (1974)
(Spaeth, J., dissenting), rev 'd - Pa. -, 377 A.2d 140 (1977). Appellate courts have not been
particularly troubled about the common-law rule of nonreview of the size of verdicts in civil
cases. See Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751,
752-58 (1957).
3. In some jurisdictions, guilty pleas account for between seventy and ninety percent
of criminal convictions. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
APPFL[ATF REVIEW OF SENTENCES I (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA
SENTENCE REVIEW STANDARDS]. In Pennsylvania, an average 44.5% of criminal convictions
have resulted from guilty pleas. GOVERNOR'S JUSTICE COMMISSION, PENNSYLVANIA CRIMIN-
AL COURT DISPOSITIONS 1971-1975.
4. See notes 106-135 and accompanying text infra.
5. See notes 136-165 and accompanying text infra.
5a See Commonwealth v. Bethea, - Pa. -, - A.2d - (1977); notes 148-165 and
accompanying text infra; Commonwealth v. Riggins, - Pa. -, 377 A.2d 140 (1977); notes
128-135 and accompanying text infra.
6. Commonwealth v. Ritter, 13 Pa. D. & C. 285,289(0. & T. Phila. 1930). This is the
only Pennsylvania case in which the court explicitly determined the penalty with reference
These inquiries will remain unanswered unless appellate tribunals
manifest increased willingness to explicitly review the substantive fair-
ness or propriety of criminal sentences. They can be greatly aided in this
task by a streamlined appellate procedure when the sanction imposed is
the only subject of review, 7 and by the establishment of a sentencing
commission' that would promulgate sentencing guidelines. By washing
their hands of the unfair-but-legal sentence, however, the higher courts
are forcing the legislature to consider the harsh alternative of mandatory
minimum sentences for specified offenses. 9 This approach may have the
advantage of transitory popular support,' ° but it sadly fails to satisfy the
fundamental requirement of criminal justice that like offenders should be
treated likely." Thus, an appellate court confronted with the question
whether it has the power to review the propriety of the lower court's
penalty should instead be asking itself, "Why has it been assumed that
this court has no such power?"'
12
II. Basis for Appellate Review of Sentences
A. Common Law Aversion to Sentence Review
One reason why it has been assumed that appellate courts lack
authority to investigate the unfair sentence is because at early common
law, criminal appeals were not allowed at all. 3 Even as the concept of
appellate review was extended to most areas of the criminal law, higher
courts still had no occasion to evaluate the merits of a particular sentence
because the sanctions prescribed were of a most determinate nature,'
4
to the appropriate objective of the punishment. See Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences
on Appeal (part 1), 37 COLUM. L. REV. 521, 528-29 (1937).
7. See notes 170-173 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 174-181 and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 182-188 and accompanying text infra.
10. See, e.g., 63 A.B.A.J. 169 (1977); Bazelon, No, Not Tougher Sentencing, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 15, 1977, at 33, col. 4 (trend noted and criticized as a false solution).
11. "Aristotle was undoubtedly right when he said that, "There can be no greater
injustice than to treat unequal things equally."' Devitt, How Can We Effectively Minimize
Unjustified Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences?, 41 F.R.D. 249, 256 (1967).
12. State v. Johnson, 67 N.J. Super. 414,424, 170 A.2d 830,836 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1961); accord, State v. Fortes, 114 R.I. 161, 173, 330 A.2d 404, 411 (1975).
13. Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences,
15 VAND. L. REV. 671, 672 (1962). "A popular justice ... needs no appellate review to an
authority higher than the people. The vox populorum is final." Id. See generally THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, DEFINITE SENTENCING: AN EXAMINATION OF PROPOSALS
IN FOUR STATES 3-6 (1976) [hereinafter cited as COUNCIL ON DEFINITE SENTENCING].
14. At common law there was little distinction between the type of crime and the
penalty imposed.
If a man commit a single Robbery, hanging is the punishment inflicted by law; if
he commit Robbery and Murder with never so many cruel circumstances, the
punishment is still the same and no more; so little regard is had in proportioning
the punishment to the offense, that the letter of the law makes no difference
between picking a man's pocket and cutting his throat.
Emlyn, Preface to the Second Edition of I T. HOWELL, STATE TRIALS at xxxii (5th ed. 1816).
In colonial Pennsylvania, contrary to the myth that criminal malefactors received kindly
treatment at the hands of the benevolent Quakers, capital offenses included, besides
malicious homicide,
leaving little or no discretion to the trial judge. Sentence review was thus
restricted to the question whether the sentence imposed was legal (i.e.,
within statutorily authorized limits). Since this matter was resolved in the
same manner as any other error of law, the English practice was to
discharge the defendant upon the mere finding of illegality. 5 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, however, refused to accept this "monstrous
doctrine." 16
With the growth of the convictiofi that one fixed punishment for a
crime cannot be applied to all classes of criminals, statutes were enacted
to provide for indeterminate sentencing.' 7 This type of penal disposition
has substantially increased the discretionary power of the trial judge t8 and
has, therefore, dictated that sentence review be directed to the propriety
of the sanction.
Appellate tribunals, however, have been uncharacteristically timid
in purging the common-law rule of nonreview. 19 Such hesitation is
high treason, petit treason, misprison of treason, coining, robbery, conjuration,
witchcraft, arson, attempted rape, buggery, concealing the death of a bastard
child, advising to kill, piracy, rape, sodomy, burglary, horse stealing, manslaugh-
ter, mayhem, and all other second offense felonies . . . except larceny.
Sellers, Penal Severity in Colonial Pennsylvania, 47 PA. B.A.Q. 230,231 (1976) (emphasis in
original).
15. See, e.g., King v. Bourne, 112 Eng. Rep. 393 (K.B. 1837); King v. Ellis, 108 Eng.
Rep. 147 (K.B. 1826). This approach was also adopted in some American jurisdictions, see,
e.g., Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 43 Mass. 419 (1841); Elliot v. People, 13 Mich. 365
(1865).
16. Beale v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa. (I Casey) 11, 22 (1855). It was opined that
[ilf this court sanctioned such a rule [of discharging the defendant though his guilt
is clearly established], it would fail to perform the chief duty for which it was
established. Our duty is to correct errors, and to 'minister justice.' But such a
course would perpetuate error, and produce the most intolerable injustice.
Id. See also White v. Commonwealth, 3 Brewster 30 (Pa. 1867) (supreme court has full
authority to resentence); Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. (I Harris) 25 (1850); Daniels v.
Commonwealth, 7 Pa. (7 Barr) 371 (1848); Drew v. Commonwealth, I Whart. 279 (Pa. 1836).
17. Concern with providing a punishment to fit the individual criminal was not the
only motive for enactment of indeterminate sentencing statutes. They were at least as much
the result of prison institutions so overcrowded that state governors were forced to grant
routine pardons just to make room for newcomers. COUNCIL ON DEFINITE SENTENCING,
supra note 13, at 4.
Indeterminate sentencing was enacted in Pennsylvania by the Act of June 19, 1911, P.L.
1055, § 6 (current version codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1057 (Purdon 1964)). Under
this statute, the sentencing judge must state both a minimum and a maximum sentence, and
the minimum may never exceed one-half of the maximum. Id. The defendant may not be
considered for parole until the minimum sentence has been served. See generally Young,
When Should the Judge State a Minimum Sentence?, 44 PA. B.A.Q. 551 (1973).
18. [lit is surely no overstatement to say that 'the new penology has resulted in
vesting in judges and parole and probation agencies the greatest degree of uncon-
trolled power over the liberty of human beings that one can find in the legal
system.' The process would be totally unruly even if judges were superbly and
uniformly trained for the solemn work of sentencing. As everyone knows, howev-
er, they are not trained at all.
Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 1,6 (1972); accord, ABA SENTENCE
REviEw STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 1-2.
19. In State v. Gamelgard, 287 Minn. 74, 80, 177 N.W.2d 404,408 (1970), for example,
the court expressed doubt that the "appellate jurisdiction afforded to this court in all cases
by our constitution embraces appellate review of sentences. We do, however, recommend
the problem illustrated by this case to the legislature." Though the United States Supreme
Court has never directly passed on the issue, many circuit and district courts have followed
unwarranted. Admittedly, no statute explicitly authorizes Pennsylvania
appellate courts to review the merits of a penalty imposed by a lower
court, 20 but their power to do so can be amply justified.
B. Statutory and Constitutional Bases for Sentence Review
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, since its inception in 1722, has
been vested with the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of King's
Bench. 21 This ancient but expansive authority, which has been employed
to engender procedural fairness in sentencing, 22 could be further invoked
to assure substantive fairness. 23 Superintending control of a sanction's
propriety is especially justified in Pennsylvania, since the basis for
exercise of this power has been amplified by statute
24 and constitution. 25
the view that "[i]f there is one rule in the federal criminal practice which is firmly estab-
lished, it is that the appellate court has no control over a sentence which is within the limits
allowed by a statute." Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1930). See Annot., 21
A.L.R. Fed. 655 (1974).
The logical basis for such hesitation is provided by the ancient maxim that expressio
unius est exclusio alterius; i.e., a power not expressly conferred is necessarily excluded.
Under this reasoning, the Supreme Court would be impotent to nullify a statute, since that
power has not been expressly conferred.
20. Jurisdictions that specifically authorize sentence review include Alaska, ALASKA
STAT. § 12.55.120 (1976); Arizona, ARiz. REV STAT. § 13-1717 (1956); California, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1237 (West 1970); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-409 (1974); Connecticut,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-196 (West Supp. 1977); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 924.41,
924.42 (West 1973); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 711-76, 711-77 (1968); Illinois, Ill. Sup. Ct.
Rule 615; Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 793.18 (West 1950); Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
21.140, 23.032- (Baldwin 1969); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 2141-2144 (1976); Mary-
land, MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, §§ 132-138 (1973); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
278, §§ 28A-D (West 1972); Montana, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 95-2211, 99-2501 (1969);
Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2508 (1964); New York, N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW §§ 450.10,
450.30 (McKinney 1971); Oregon, ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 138.050, 168.090 (1975); Tennessee,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2711 (1975).
21. Act of May 22, 1722, 1 Sm. L. 131, § 8 (current version codified at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, § 211.201-211.205 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77)). The powers of the Court of King's
Bench are expansive: "It keeps all inferior jurisdictions in the bounds of their authority, and
may either remove their proceedings to be determined here, or prohibit their progress
below." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *42. See also 4 id. at *265-67.
22. Commonwealth v. Phelps, 450 Pa. 597, 599, 301 A.2d 678, 679 (1973) (supervisory
jurisdiction used to compel disclosure of presentence reports).
23. Supervisory jurisdiction was invoked in United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500(7th
Cir. 1960) to correct sentencing disparity.
[Wihere the facts appearing in the record point convincingly to the conclusion that
the district court has, without any justification, arbitrarily singled out a minor
defendant for the imposition of a more severe sentence than that imposed upon
the co-defendants, this court will not hesitate to correct the disparity. In so doing
it is exercising its supervisory control of the district court, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. This control is necessary to proper administration in the federal
system.
Id. at 503 (emphasis added); see United States v. Humphreys, 457 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Holder, 412 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1969). But see United States v. Moore, 427
F.2d 38 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) (supervisory control over sentencing
process inappropriate when sentence imposed is mere fraction of that authorized).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.205 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77) endows the supreme
court with "extraordinary jurisdiction" to remove a case to its own bench and on its motion
if it involves "an issue of immediate public importance."
25. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 10(c) provides the supreme court with "the power to prescribe
general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts." Pursuant to
these rule-making powers, rules of sentencing procedure have been prescribed. PA. R.
CRIM. P. 1400-09. See notes 42-45 and accompanying text infra.
These broad powers, however, are limited exclusively to the supreme
court 26
Nevertheless, the superior court is implicitly empowered to review
the merits of a sentence by virtue of its original enabling statute,2 7 and
this authority has been made more explicit by enactment of the Appellate
Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970.28 The only legislative restriction placed
on sentence review is the Post Conviction Hearing Act, 29 which restricts
the reconsideration of sentences to those 'imposed without due process
of law." 30 Thus, aside from petitions for post conviction relief, the power
to scrutinize a sanction's substantive fairness rests on firm constitutional
and statutory grounds.
C. Sentence Review as an Inherent Power
Notwithstanding the constitutional and statutory authority for sen-
tence review, higher tribunals may justify their exercise of this power as a
logical corollary to appellate jurisdiction. 3 The common-law rule of
nonreview was premised on the determinate sentence, 32 but this premise
no longer exists. 33 Moreover, it is inconsistent with the policy supporting
26. Commonwealth v. Onda, 376 Pa. 405, 411, 103 A.2d 90, 91 (1954).
27. Act of June 24, 1895, P.L. 212, No. 128, § 8 (current version codified at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, §§ 211.301-211.302 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77)). The superior c,6urt has justified
sentence review on the basis of this statute in the following three cases: Commonwealth v.
Riggins, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 32, 41,332 A.2d 521,525-26 (1974) (Spaeth, J., dissenting), rev'd
on other grounds, -Pa. -, 337 A.2d 140 (1977); Commonwealth v. Bilinski, 190 Pa. Super.
Ct. 401,407, 154 A.2d 322,325 (1959); Commonwealth v. Downer, 161 Pa. Super. Ct. 339, 53
A.2d 897 (1947).
28. Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, No. 223. This statute endows the superior court
with nearly "exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all appeals from final orders of the courts of
common pleas .... " PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.302 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77). The term
"order" is defined to include "sentence." PA. STrAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 21 1.102(a)(6) (Purdon
Supp. 1976-77).
29. Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. 1580, (current version codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, §§ 1180-1-1180-14 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77)). The sentence must be reconsidered by the
same court that initially imposed it. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-5 [Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
30. Id. § 1180-2. The lower courts have inexplicably held that the provisions of the
Post Conviction Hearing Act are unavailable to a defendant seeking a sentence reduction so
long as the sentence imposed is within the statutory limits. Commonwealth v. Eller, 29
Bucks 43 (Pa. C.P. 1976); Commonwealth v. Leonard, 85 York 104 (Pa. C.P. 1971);
Commonwealth v. Eaton, 27 Monroe 57 (Pa. C.P. 1970); Commonwealth v. Abney, 46 Pa.
D. & C.2d 693 (C.P. Phila. 1969). This position is broader than necessary, since the statute
permits relief if the sanction imposed fails to comport with due process. Moreover, it is
inconsistent with decisions by higher courts granting post conviction relief to those sen-
tenced by a judge who considered subsequently invalidated convictions. See notes 84-90 and
accompanying text infra.
31. Jurisdictions that have recognized sentence review as an inherent power include
Idaho, see State v. Butler, 93 Idaho 492, 464 P.2d 931 (19700; Michigan, see People v.
Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d 878 (1972); Missouri, see State v. Caffey, 365 S.W.2d
607 (Mo. 1963); New Jersey, see State v. Johnson, 67 N.J. Super. 414, 170 A.2d 830 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1961); Oklahoma, see Kolke v. State, 507 P.2d 596 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973);
and Wisconsin, see State v. Tuttle, 21 Wis. 2d 147, 124 N.W.2d 9 (1963).
32. See notes 14, 17 supra.
33. It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.
the indeterminate sentence to permit the trial judge to mold his sentence
to each particula" case, but to adamantly refuse review of that decision to
determine whether it makes any sense.' This inconsistency was forth-
rightly recognized by Judge Spaeth in Commonwealth v. Riggins.
35
[T]here is a fundamental reason, more persuasive even than
precedent or statute,why the power to review a sentence must
extend to any sentence that 'is manifestly excessive, whether or
not any constitutional issue is presented. This reason is that
without that power we cannot have a rational criminal justice
system .6
Thus, it is apparent that appellate courts have ample authorization to
evaluate the propriety of a given sentence. Their hesitation to exercise
this authority is difficult to understand, particularly since the supreme
court has imposed a myriad of procedural requirements on the sentencing
process to assure that the trial judge has an adequate informational basis
for pronouncing a substantively fair sentence.
III. Scope of Sentencing Review
A. Review of Procedural Fairness of Sentence
The strength of the United States Supreme Court's desire to max-
imize the informational- basis for the imposition of criminal sentences is
evidenced by its declaration that. an otherwise inviolate "due process
clause should not be treated -as a device for freezing the evidential
procedure at senteficing in the trial mold."-37 The sentencing court,
therefore, is not bound by the narrow evidentiary rules applicable at
trial. 3 Nevertheless; for a sanction to be procedurally fair,39 the trial
0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1920), cited with approval in State v. Johnson,
67 N.J. Super. 414, 428, 170 A.2d 830,.838 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961).
34. ABA SENTENCE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note-3, at 2-3.
35. 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 32, 332 A.2d.521 (1974), rev'd, - Pa. -, 337 A.2d 140 (1977).
36. Id. at 42, 332 A.2d at 526 (emphasis addedXdissenting opinion).
37. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245-46 (1949).
38. In Williams, for example, the Court rejected the contention that the sentencing
court could not'consider the information contained in a presentence report unless it was also
given in open court by witnesses subject to cross-examination.
[Presentence reports) have been given a high'value by conscientious judges who
want to sentence persons on the best available information rather than on guess-
work . . . [They draw] on information concerning every aspect of a defendant's
life. The type and extent of this information make totally impracticable if not
impossible open court testimony with crossexamination. Such a procedure would
endlessly delay criminal administration in a retrial of collateral issues.
Id. at 249-50; accord, Commonwealth v. Mann, 23 Chest. 386 (Pa. C.P. 1975) (defendant's
counsel has no right to cross-examine those who supply sentencing information); Common-
wealth ex rel. Gilson v. Keenan, I I Pa.- D. & C.2d 70 (C.P. Craw. 1956), aff'dper curiam on
opinion below, 185 Pa. Super. Ct. 49, 138 A.2d 259 (1958) (contention that sentencing court
may not consider presentence report is -utterly ridiculous"). Though the requirements of
due process apply to the sentencing procedure, they are not "as stringent as those at trial."
Commonwealth v. Opara, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 511, 521, 362 A.2d 305, 310 (1976); Common-
wealth v. Shoemaker, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 203, 212, 313 A.2d 342, 347 (1973). The due process
requirement at the sentencing proceeding is addressed to the necessity that the court engage
in an informed exercise of discretion. See notes 40-41 infra.
39. A review of the procedural fairness of a sentence is meant to be an examination of
"the manner in which the sent.ence was imposed, including the sufficiency and accuracy of
jurist must carefully scrutinize all the evidence presented during the
sentencing proceeding 40 and fully comprehend the possible penalties for
the offense.4 1
This emphasis on an informed exercise of sentencing discretion is
also reflected by procedural rules4 2 promulgated by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. Chief among these are the following directives: (1) the
trial judge should be the jurist who structures the sanction, 43 (2) the
sentencing judge should either order a presentence investigation report or
place in the record an explanation of why it is deemed unnecessary,44 and
(3) the contents of the presentence investigative report should be dis-
closed to the defendant's counsel. 45 A procedurally fair sentence, howev-
er, depends upon more than mere extension of the trial court's informa-
tional horizon. The factual data considered by the trial court may be
contaminated by prejudice or error. This possibility could easily be
minimized by increasing the role of the defendant's counsel in the
sentencing process.
1. The Role of Defendant's Counsel in the Sentencing Process.-
Since sentencing is regarded as a "critical stage" 46 in the criminal
process, the prisoner is entitled to counsel during the sentencing hear-
the information on which it was based." ABA SENTENCE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 3,
at § 3.2(ii). It is not meant to be limited by the due process clause. See generally Note,
Appellate Review of Sentencing Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 379 (1964).
40. In Commonwealth v. Cater, 396 Pa. 172, 152 A.2d 259 (1959), for example, the
sentencing tribunal inadvertently attributed statements made in a confession by one defend-
ant to the others. The supreme court remanded for resentencing because "there is no room
for a scintilla of error." Id. at 182, 152 A.2d at 265. See also Commonwealth v. Hill, 237 Pa.
Super. Ct. 543, 353 A.2d 870 (1975) (remanded for resentencing because trial court errone-
ously referred to defendant as though he had committed repeated offenses).
41. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Henderson, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 525, 341 A.2d 195
(1975) (remanded for resentencing because trial judge misunderstood the maximum sen-
tence applicable even though sentence imposed was legal).
42. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1401-09.
43. PA. R. CRIm. P. 1401(a) provides in pertinent part as follows: "[T]he judge who
presided at the trial or who received the plea of guilty or nolo contendre shall impose the
sentence unless there are extraordinary circumstances which preclude his presence." (em-
phasis added) Extraordinary circumstances exist in the following situations: (1) when the
sentence is on a plea of guilty or nolo contendre and local court rules provide for substitu-
tion, see PA. R. CRIM. P. 141(b) and Comment, or (2) when there is sickness, inability to act,
or some other substantial cause that would render the trial judge's continued presence
impossible, see Commonwealth v. Thompson, 328 Pa. 27, 195 A. 115 (1937); Commonwealth
v. Rhoads, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 197, 323 A.2d 249 (1974); Commonwealth v. Clay, 224 Pa.
Super. Ct. 461, 307 A.2d 341 (1973) (extraordinary circumstances do not arise merely
because trial judge was a visiting judge).
44. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1403. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 351 A.2d 650
(1976).
45. PA. R. CRIM. P 1404. The defendant is entitled to "disclosure of portions not
secured on a confidential basis." PA. R. CRIM. P. 1404, Comment; see Commonwealth v.
Phelps, 450 Pa. 597, 301 A.2d 678 (1973); Commonwealth v. Stanton, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 47,
362 A.2d 355 (1976).
46. In Commonwealth v. Stakes, 435 Pa. 535, 541, 257 A.2d 828, 831 (1969), a critical
stage in the criminal process is defined as a situation "where legal rights may be preserved
or lost, or where some factual or legal disadvantage may be suffered by the accused."
ing. 47 This prophylactic guards against "the careless or designed mispro-
nouncement or pronouncement of sentence on a foundation [that is]
extensively and materially false." 4 8 But when a defendant refuses to
exercise his right of allocution,4 9 it is arguable that the absence of counsel
works no harm to the accused. 50 The state supreme court has rejected this
rationalization, postulating that a defendant's failure to speak does not
mandate the conclusion that nothing "could have been said by coun-
sel."'" From this it can be inferred that counsel must be present in every
situation in which a false foundation for the imposition of sentence could
be prevented.
(a) Right to counsel during presentence interview.-A false foun-
dation for the imposition of sentence could be easily laid during the
course of a presentence interview of the defendant by a probation depart-
ment investigator. The supreme court has candidly recognized that
[e]ven if probation officers were all extremely competent and
had manageable case loads, still the law of averages would
dictate that every once in a while a mistake-perhaps serious-
would be made. And the fact is that many probation officers are
not as competent as they really ought to be, and their case loads
are in fact so burdensome that they cannot possibly give each
case the time and care that it should receive. 2
Thus, since there is an imminent possibility that factual disadvantage will
be suffered by the accused, the presentence interview can be considered a
"critical stage" in the criminal process that entitles the prisoner to
counsel.
5 3
Nevertheless, in Commonwealth v. Burton54 the supreme court
refused to follow its own reasoning and instead ruled that a convicted
defendant has no right to an attorney during the course of the probation
department's presentence interview. It was opined that "[in order to be
effective, an investigator must build a certain rapport with the defendant,
so that the true nature of the defendant's personality may be discovered.
The presence of counsel at such an interview could only frustrate this
purpose. "
55
This belief that a lawyer can only obstruct the path to truthful
47. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); accord, Commonwealth v. Johnson, 428 Pa.
210, 236 A.2d 805 (1%8); Commonwealth ex rel. Remeriez v. Maroney, 415 Pa. 534, 204
A.2d 450 (1964).
48. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948).
49. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1405(a).
50. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Whitling v. Russell, 195 Pa. Super. Ct. 277, 171
A.2d 819 (1961). rev'd on other grounds, 406 Pa. 45, 176 A.2d 641 (1962).
51. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 428 Pa. 210, 215, 236 A.2d 805, 808 (1968) (emphasis
in original).
52. Commonwealth v. Phelps, 450 Pa. 597, 607, 301 A.2d 678, 683 (1973). Compare
Feit, "Before Sentence is Pronounced... ". A Guide to Defense Counsel in the Exercise of
Postconviction Responsibilities, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 140, 148 (1973).
53. See note 46 supra.
54. 451 Pa. 12, 301 A.2d 675 (1973) (Manderino, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 14-15, 301 A.2d at 677.
factfinding has been expressly rejected by the United States Supreme
Court on several occasions.5 6 If counsel's presence is deemed to impair
the ability to obtain accurate information, it may seriously be questioned
whether an attorney's presence should even be required at trial. By being
present at the presentence interview, counsel could both prevent the
infiltration of error into the investigator's report and encourage the con-
victed defendant to overcome an understandable caution.57 Moreover,
exclusion of counsel at the presentence interview can only increase the
present tendency among attorneys to regard their duties as essentially
finished after the defendant has been convicted.58
(b) Right to present mitigating circumstances.-Burton's exclu-
sion of counsel at the presentence interview was further premised on the
hope that "if his client contests any portion of the [presentence] report,
counsel can offer evidence in rebuttal and disclose the inaccuracies in the
report to the judge." 59 This suggestion assumes too much. First, the
attorney's right to dispute the contents of a presentence report is limited to
"comment."6' Second, it is difficult to believe that even a lawyer from
mere "inspection" of the document can effectively determine whether it
is free from a "scintilla of error." 61 Last, assuming arguendo that
inaccuracy can be found and that evidence is offered to rebut that
misinformation, the sentencing court can simply refuse the offer.
62
56. Compare United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237-38 (1967) with id. at 258-59.
See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480-81 (1966).
57. [H]ow many criminal defendants are typically undereducated, inarticulate,
and highly suspicious of the criminal justice system? After being counseled up to
the time of sentencing that it is better to say as little as possible, how simple will it
be to coax the defendant to speak freely at the onetime openness may be benefi-
cial unless counsel is present at the interview to guide and encourage him?
Note, Criminal Procedure-Post-Conviction Right to Counsel, 77 W. VA. L. REV. 571, 575
(1974); accord, Kuh, For a Meaningful Right to Counsel on Sentencing, 57 A.B.A.J, 1096,
1099 (1971).
58. According to the ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 245-46 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter
cited as ABA SENTENCING ALTERNATIVE STANDARDS],
[M]any lawyers view their function at sentencing to involve superficial incanta-
tions of mercy; others merely to seek the lightest possible sentence without much
concern for the real needs of the defendant. Few, in any event, undertake the type
of preparation which the sentencing proceedings calls for, and which is a com-
monly understood duty at preceding stages of the case.
See Feit, supra note 52, at 140; Kuh, supra note 58, at 1096. The ABA approach dictates
that the lawyer at the sentencing stage should "assume the same position of advocacy that is
his duty at the trial." ABA SENTENCING ALTERNATIVE STANDARDS, supra at 246. See
generally Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal Services in the
Criminal-Correctional Process, 18 KAN. L. REV. 493 (1970).
59. 451 Pa. at 15, 301 A.2d at 677.
60. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1404(a)(2). See note 45 supra.
61. See note 40 supra.
62. In Commonwealth v. Mann, 23 Chest. 386 (Pa. C.P. 1975), for example, the
defendant offered testimony to overcome what he asserted were inaccuracies in the report.
The sentencing judge, however, refused the offer and "indicated that the only criminal
transactions that he would consider as part of the defendant's prior record were those of
which he had been convicted." Id. at 387. Nevertheless, the court later stated that "the
sentence imposed reflected our judgment of that which was proper after considering the
presentence report. " Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
Although it is not suggested that the court conduct a second trial at
the sentencing stage, counsel should at least "be allowed to perform
some of the functions which justify his presence. "63 These would include
the right to cross-examine the probation officer who prepared the pre-
sentence report64 and the right to be present during the presentence
interview. These requirements are essential to insure a procedurally fair
sentence, especially since there are very few restraints upon the types of
information that the sentencing judge may consider before imposing
sentence.
2. Sentencing Court Consideration of Prior and Subsequent Ar-
rests -Pennsylvania's appellate tribunals have invariably sustained low-
er court consideration of prior65 and subsequent 66 arrests as an aid to
determine the appropriate sentence. Moreover, they have failed to restrict
the inferences that a sentencing judge may draw when confronted with
evidence that an accused has previously been arrested.
In Commonwealth v. Shoemaker,67 for example, the trial court
attached great significance to the defendant's four prior and nine subse-
quent arrests. It even presumed that "you probably stole many, many
more times than shows on the sheet. We know that and so do you.
Anybody who [has] been involved with heroin knows that." 68 In affirm-
ing the sentence, Judge Spaeth reflected that
[a]lthough the sentencing judge should not have inferred that
arrests showed crimes, perhaps nevertheless the inference was
correct. It has at least not been shown to have been incor-
rect. . . .It was counsel's responsibility to offer whatever evi-
dence he could to show that the inference was mistaken.69
Forcing defendant's lawyer to show the court exactly what disposition
was made of arrests appearing in a report that he had no part in prepar-
ing 70 places on him an unenviable and perhaps unsustainable7 1 burden.
63. Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing For Felony, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 821, 827 (1968). See Feit, supra note 52, at 155-57 for a suggested sentencing checklist
that can be followed by counsel before the sanction is imposed.
64. 22 WAYNE L. REV. 899, 911 (1976). Such procedures at an informal hearing
are rudimentary safeguards which would not result in a formal trial of the issues,
but would probably result in the preparation of more accurate presentence re-
ports. Although these procedures might be time consuming or expensive, funda-
mental constitutional rights should not be sacrificed merely for the sake of
economy or convenience.
Id.
65. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tisdale, 233 Pa. Super. Ct. 77, 334 A.2d 722 (1975);
Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 203, 313 A.2d 342 (1973).
66. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tisdale, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 77, 334 A.2d 722 (1975);
Commonwealth v. Bilinski, 190 Pa. Super. Ct. 401, 154 A.2d 322 (1959).
67. 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 203, 313 A.2d 342 (1973), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 462
Pa. 342, 341 A.2d III (1975).
68. Id. at 208, 313 A.2d at 345.
69. Id. at 213, 313 A.2d at 348 (emphasis added).
70. See notes 53-56 and accompanying text supra.
71. The difficulty in determining the disposition of an arrest was noted by the sentenc-
ing judge in Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 24 Bucks 142 (Pa. C.P. 1973).
The burden of establishing the eventual disposition of prior and
subsequent arrests has now been shifted by the Sentencing Code, 72 which
provides that "[tihe court shall order that an appropriate agency shall
determine all criminal charges brought in any court against the defendant
and report to the court on the status or disposition of such charges."
7 3
Since the legislature has stated in specific language that an arrest shall be
considered an arrest, it is essential to determine precisely what signifi-
cance a jurist may attach to prior and subsequent arrests.
A mere arrest tells the sentencing court nothing. Although such
information may aid the court in acquiring knowledge of the character
and history of the defendant, 74 it can also be extremely prejudicial.
75
Information relevant to sentencing can be gleaned from a prior or subse-
quent arrest only by inference, which is a fragile basis on which to
deprive a person of his liberty. In Commonwealth v. Kulp ,7 6 for example,
the trial court had personal knowledge that illicit narcotics sales were
transacted at a certain situs, and so it inferred that the convicted accused
had been "dealing in traffic" because he had made one narcotics sale at
that situs. The superior court remanded for resentencing, explaining that
an impermissible inference had been drawn from the available informa-
tion.7 7 Thus, if a court cannot presume that a defendant is dealing in
narcotics from his arrest at a situs where it knows that such sales are
The absence of dispositions may be attributed to the failure of many local police
departments to notify the F.B.I. of the same after a case has been finally
concluded. To follow the course of any particular criminal case to its final
conclusion in this modern age, it must be remembered, is not too easy a job for the
arresting officer. Even counsel and judges have some difficulty in knowing what
the 'final' outcome of a criminal prosecution is, was, or may be, in any given
instance. On the other hand, arrest records are now invariably recorded since the
practice of fingerprinting every arrestee is almost universal today.
Id. at 144. See also note 64 and accompanying text supra.
72. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, §§ 1301-82 (current version codified
at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1301-82 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77)).
73. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1337 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77) (emphasis added).
According to the REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION,
-[T]he court should place express responsibility to ascertain all outstanding charges and
sentences on the court administrator, or on the district attorney. Reliance on the defendant,
or on the presentence report, has not proved satisfactory." S. TOLL, PENNSYLVANIA CRIMES
CODE ANNOTATED 39 (Supp. 1976).
74. This was the justification offered for the court's consideration of indictments
against the defendant in United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 919 (1973). It was further argued that this type of information is more reliable than
other hearsay evidence garnered by the probation officer because "the indictments are
based on testimony given under oath and [require] the existence of probable cause." Id. at
1142.
75. The ABA has taken the position that the inclusion of prior or subsequent arrests as
part of the accused's prior criminal record can be "extremely misleading and damaging."
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROBATION § 2.3(ii)(B), Comment at 37
(Approved Draft 1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA PROBATION STANDARDS]. Moreover, it
would be naive to suggest that the court has complete ability to overcome such prejudice
when it is psychologically allied with both police and prosecutor. See Amsterdam, The
Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 785, 792
(1970).
76. 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 397, 344 A.2d 602 (1975).
77. Id. at 405, 344 A.2d at 604.
made, it is inconceivable that it can infer anything from arrests of which it
knows nothing. But rather than retreat from its Shoemaker position, the
superior court has further posited that a sentencing tribunal may base its
sentence in part on charges of which the accused has actually been
acquitted.7 8 This position is totally inconsistent with the rationale mandat-
ing that a sanction molded in part on prior convictions that are subse-
quently invalidated must be reconsidered.7 9
3. Sentencing Court Consideration of Prior Criminal Offenses.-
Consideration of prior criminal offenses is essential to the determination
of the appropriate disposition of the convicted defendant. Evidence of
such offenses is admitted at the sentencing stage either in the form of
prior convictions 80 or as statements by the defendant admitting his guilt.81
Appellate courts have even conceded the validity of - the technique by
which the accused is confronted with his prior convictions at an appropri-
ate moment during the sentencing proceeding to test the veracity of his
allocution.82 This can be of great aid to the trial judge because the
defendant's version of prior offenses is surely "of importance when
considering his prior motivations and how the offense fits into his life
pattern."
83
(a) Consideration of subsequently invalidated convictions.-The
trial jurist, however, cannot consider a prior conviction that has later been
reversed because of constitutional error. Thus, in United States v. Tuck-
er84 the Supreme Court refused to let a sentence stand that had been based
in part on three prior convictions that were subsequently invalidated
because the defendant had not been represented by counsel. 85 In Pennsyl-
vania, reconsideration of sentence is required upon a mere showing of an
invalidated conviction of which the sentencing judge was aware before
imposing sentence.8 It is immaterial whether the trial court explicitly
referred to the prior offense.
78. In Commonwealth v. Straw, 238 Pa, Super. Ct. 535, 361 A.2d 427 (1976), the
defendant was charged with attempting to elude the police in a high speed chase and with
possessing a blackjack. The jury convicted the defendant on only the prohibited weapon
offense, but the court in imposing sentence stated, "We're satisfied from the circumstances
that the defendant was certainly involved and knew what was going on when the officers
gave chase and chased him around." Id. at 539, 361 A.2d at 429. Nevertheless, the superior
court affirmed the sentence. In effect, the trial court was permitted to disregard the jury's
verdict of not guilty.
79. See notes 86-89 and accompanying text infra.
80. Commonwealth v. Bell, 417 Pa. 291, 296-97, 208 A.2d 465, 468 (1965).
81. Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98, 117-18, 283 A.2d 58, 69 (1971).
82. Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 203, 211, 313 A.2d 342, 346
(1973) (dictum).
83. ABA PROBATION STANDARDS, supra note 75, § 2.3(ii) (B), Comment at 37.
84. 404 U.S. 443 (1973).
85. The Court remanded for resentencing because the penalty was "founded at least
in part upon misinformation of constitutional magnitude." Id. at 447.
86. Commonwealth v. Calvert, 463 Pa. 211, 344 A.2d 797 (1975); cf. Commonwealth
v. Hewlett, 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 55, 58, 296 A.2d 846, 848 (1972) (defendant does not have to
If appellate courts are to generally refrain from scrutinizing the
thought processes of trial judges in the review of sentencing
matters, we likewise should refrain from speculating as to the
importance attached to previous convictions by the trial judge
in reaching those decisions. 7
Thus, the appellate tribunal is not declaring that the sentencing court
abused its discretion; it is merely stating that the lower court lacked the
proper information upon which to base its exercise of discretion.
The obvious reason why the sentencing court in such situations fails
to make an informed exercise of discretion is because it is equating
convictions and arrests.8 8 Therefore, it is only logical to conclude that
prior arrests should not be treated as convictions. Yet, this is precisely
what occurs when a judge considers and draws inferences from charges
on the accused's record for which the defendant has only been arrested or
perhaps has even been acquitted.89 Because their probative value is slight
in comparison to the possibility of prejudice that might ensue, 90 prior and
subsequent arrests should be excluded entirely from presentence reports.
But while no arrest can be considered a conviction, not all subsequently
invalidated convictions can be reduced to the status of mere arrests.
(b) Subsequently invalidated convictions and the exclusionary
rule.-In United States v. Tucker, 9' the prior convictions considered by
the court in imposing sentence for a later offense were reversed because
the defendant had been denied counsel. The sentence imposed for the
later offense had to be reconsidered because the denial of counsel cast
grave doubt on whether the defendant was in fact guilty of those prior
offenses. But not every reversal is premised on the rationale that the
accused has been denied a constitutional right affecting the determination
of his guilt. This becomes especially apparent when the reversal results
from the trial court's refusal to apply the exclusionary rule to the fruit of
an illegal search and seizure. In these situations, since there is usually no
doubt that the accused is guilty, 92 the mere reversal cannot logically
show that subsequently invalidated conviction resulted in an enhanced sentence). But once
the sentence has been reconsidered, if the sentencing judge refuses to reduce the sentence,
his decision will not be disturbed absent a showing that the prior conviction actually
motivated the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Brown, 443 Pa. 274, 278, 278 A.2d
170, 172 (1974).
87. Commonwealth v. Hewlett, 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 55, 59, 296 A.2d 846, 848 (1972).
88. Brief for Respondent at 9, United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
89. See notes 67-81 and accompanying text supra.
90. See 22 WAYNE L. REv. 899, 906 (1976).
91. 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
92. The exclusionary rule has nothing to do with the guilt of the accused. Its justifica-
tion rests in deterring lawless police action, see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636
(1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961), and in protecting the personal interest of
the defendant, see Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530, 532 (1926). To qualify for the relief
provided by this prophylactic, "(I) the complaining party must be the one whose personal
rights were infringed by the search and seizure; and (2) if so, the evidence will be excluded if
the action will serve to deter future police misconduct." Note, Application of the Exclusio-
nary Rule at Sentencing, 57 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1268 (1971).
reduce the accused to the status of a mere arrestee. Therefore, there
would be no need to reconsider a sentence based in part on a conviction
resulting from such illegally obtained evidence, even though it is subse-
quently invalidated.
This question has not been specifically considered by the courts. It is
noteworthy, however, that the federal courts have been permitted to
consider the evidence of an illegal search and seizure, properly excluded
at trial, in determining the appropriate disposition of the defendant. 93 In
United States v. Shipani,94 for example, the Second Circuit held that the
sentencing court could consider illegally obtained wiretapping evidence
in determining the appropriate sanction even though that evidence was
excluded at trial.
We believe that applying the exclusionary rule for a second
time at sentencing after having applied it once at the trial itself
would not add in any significant way to the deterrent effect of
the rule. It is quite unlikely that law enforcement officials con-
duct illegal electronic auditing to build up an inventory of infor-
mation for sentencing purposes .9
It is even more unlikely that illegal searches and seizures are conducted so
that the trial judge may consider the improper convictions thereby ob-
tained in determining suitable punishment for a crime that has not yet
been committed.
The various procedural directives devised by appellate tribunals
concerning the admissibility of prior convictions, prior and subsequent
arrests, and the presence of counsel during the sentencing proceeding
have undeniably expanded the sentencing court's informational basis.
Implementation of these procedural safeguards should, in fact, decrease
the necessity of reviewing a sanction's substantive fairness. 96 But if the
93. See United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Shipani,
435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971); United States v. Baratta, 360 F.
Supp. 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (court considered for sentencing purposes illegal evidence that
defendant's home contained an entire plant for the wholesale manufacture and distribution
of narcotics). The federal courts, however, have steadfastly refused to consider con-
taminated evidence for sentencing purposes if the evidence obtained is constitutionally
untrustworthy. See United States ex rel. Brown v. Rundle, 417 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1969)
(unconstitutionally obtained confession); United States ex rel. Rivers v. Myers, 384 F.2d
737 (2d Cir. 1967) (unconstitutionally obtained confession).
94. 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971).
95. 435 F.2d at 28 (emphasis added). In Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599 (9th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 961 (1971), the court was confronted with an illegal search
and seizure made after the police had already gathered enough evidence to convict the
defendant. To determine what incentive the police would have for engaging in such an
expedition, the court considered the five to twenty year range in the applicable penalty and
the resultant enhancement of sentence that the introduction of the tainted evidence would
necessitate.
Unless the evidence were unavailable for sentence as well as conviction, the
agents had nothing to lose by risking an unlawful search; if the motion to suppress
were denied, [the accused] could be convicted of an additional offense; if it were
granted, the sentence on the original charge could still be enhanced.
Id. at 612. Therefore, when there is a substantial incentive to engage in illegal search and
seizure, such as the incentive to increase a sentence, the evidence should be excluded.
96. It has been observed by one commentator that
trial court is to properly exercise its discretion in sentencing, it is incum-
bent that appellate courts more effectively determine what types of
information may be considered. If prior arrests are considered at all, they
should be considered as arrests and not as convictions. 97 If counsel is
permitted to take part in the sentencing process, his role should be
expanded from the present shadow play. 98 Finally, assuming that the
sentencing court has all the information that may properly be considered,
its sentence may still be unfair unless a general sentencing policy is
established that directs the jurist to the appropriate objective of punish-
ment in a given situation. This goal can be achieved only if appellate
tribunals affirmatively review both the propriety of the sentence and the
manner in which it was imposed.
B. Review of Substantive Fairness of Sentence
Review of the substantive fairness 99 of a sentence has been ostens-
ibly limited to the question whether it is so manifestly excessive that it
constitutes too severe a punishment. 100 Since this is a mixed question of
law and fact,"' appellate courts have to date ruled that only the defendant
can base an appeal on the sentence's propriety. 1 2 While this partially
explains the reluctance of appellate tribunals to evaluate the severity of
otherwise legal sentences, it does not excuse their hesitation in formulat-
ing an explicit penal policy by which the sentencing discretion of lower
[p]rocedural review, in fact, can be seen as a way of implementing the policy of
the rule of non-review, by forcing trial judges to put their purported expertise to
work. It is a technique through which an appellate court can force a trial judge to
make use of his unique opportunities for gathering information in order to in-
crease his knowledge of the defendant and to utilize his acquired experience more
rationally.
Note, Appellate Review of Sentencing Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 379, 366 (1964).
97. ABA STANDARDS, PROBATION, supra note 75, § 2.3 (ii)(B), Comment at 37.
98. See note 59 supra.
99. Review of the substantive fairness of the sentence is meant to include review of
"the excessiveness of the sentence, having regard to the nature of the offense, the character
of the offender, and the protection of the public interest ... ABA SENTENCE REvIFW
STANDARDS, supra note 3, § 3.2(ii) at 51. It is designed to reach, in addition to excessive
sentences, "the sentence that has no rational basis, the sentence that is dictated by emotion,
the sentence that is wrong in principle, and sentences suffering from similar defects." Id. It
is also designed to reach the permissive sentence, for otherwise "appellate review would
simply be an effort to reduce all sentences to the lowest common denominator; its target
would merely be the arbitrariness that is excessive. Permissiveness may be arbitrary too."
Rubin, How We Can Improve Judicial Treatment of Individual Cases Without Sacrificing
Individual Rights: The Problems of the Criminal Law, 70 F.R.D. 176, 195 (1976).
100. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 450 Pa. 152, 299 A.2d 640 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Wrona, 442 Pa. 201, 275 A.2d 78 (1971); Commonwealth v. Marks, 442 Pa. 208,275 A.2d 81
(1971); Commonwealth v. Riggins, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 32, 232 A.2d 521 (1974), rev'don other
grounds, - Pa. -, 377 A.2d 140 (1977).
101. Commonwealth v. Williams, 456 Pa. 550, 317 A.2d 250 (1974).
102. Commonwealth v. Marks, 442 Pa. 208, 275 A.2d 81 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Wrona, 442 Pa. 201, 275 A.2d 78 (1971). Both Marks and Wrona involved appeals for
sentence review by an unsatisfied Commonwealth. In each case, however, it was held that
the Commonwealth had no basis to appeal unless pure issues of law were involved, i.e.,
questions whether the sentence imposed was either within the statutorily authorized limits
or constitutionally permissible. See notes 192-94 and accompanying text infra.
courts could be guided.' 3 Pennsylvania's higher courts have recognized
two indispensable elements of the substantively fair sentence-its rational
basis'0 4 and its freedom from disparity. 
0 5
1. The Rational Basis for the Sentence.-In Commonwealth v.
Martin,'0 6 the supreme court recently vacated six sentences because the
trial judges failed to consider two elements vital to an appropriate disposi-
tion of the individualized sentence mandated by Pennsylvania law: the
particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the defend-
ant. ' 07 Justice Nix, joined by then Chief Justice Jones, dissented. "In my
judgment the majority opinion introduces a concept of appellate review
that would permit an appellate tribunal to superimpose its sentencing
philosophy upon the sentencing court."' 08 Pennsylvania's appellate
courts, however, have long required the trial jurist to examine the circum-
stances of the act and actor before passing sentence. 109 In Commonwealth
v. Green,' ' for example, the supreme court vacated the death penalty
imposed on a fifteen year old boy for the murder of a seventy-five year
old druggist. "The court below in deterining the appropriate penalty
considered the criminal act, but not the criminal himself and in so doing
committed an abuse of discretion.""'
Appellate and trial courts, however, have not always attached the
same substantiality to these considerations in imposing sentence. This is
because these characteristics are not alone determinative of whether there
was a rational basis for the sentence.
Rather than merely looking to considerations of act or actor,
the modern appellate court with review power in each case
coming before it for appellate review, must ask itself this ques-
tion: Does this sentence, as far as this convict in this society is
concerned, serve the functional purpose of general and special
103. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Givens, 363 Pa. 141, 147, 69 A.2d 142, 144 (1949);
Commonwealth v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 A. 733 (1932).
104. See notes 108-35 and accompanying text infra.
105. See notes 136-65 and accompanying text infra.
106. 466 Pa. 118, 351 A.2d 650 (1976).
107. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1403(2) provides, "The presentence investigative report shall
include information regarding the circumstances of the offense and the character of the
defendant sufficient to assist the court in determining sentence." In Martin, the court held
that "regardless whether a pre-sentence report is ordered, the sentencing court must at least
consider these two factors in its sentencing determination." 466 Pa. at 133, 351 A.2d at 658.
108. Id. at 138, 351 A.2d at 660.
109. Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959); Commonwealth v.
Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 A. 733 (1932); Commonwealth v. Warner, 227 Pa. Super. Ct.
291, 324 A.2d 361 (1974) (defendant's near loss of arm considered); Commonwealth v.
Rodriguez, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 449, 323 A.2d 396 (1974) (defendant's language barrier
considered); Commonwealth v. Herbin, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 335, 323 A.2d 252 (1974) (defend-
ant's alcoholic problems considered); Commonwealth v. Pouls, 198 Pa. Super. Ct. 595, 182
A.2d 261 (1962) (defendant not most vicious rapist known to the law).
110. 396 Pa. 127, 151 A.2d 241 (1959).
111. Id. at 150, 151 A.2d at 247. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Jones, who
dissented in Martin, wrote the majority opinion in Green. This may indicate that the
circumstances considered when reviewing the death penalty need not be examined for all
penalties.
prevention and accord with the proper retributive feeling of the
community? If the answer is clearly no, on all the evidence on
which the trial court acted and which is now before the appel-
late court, an abuse of discretion has occurred, and the appel-
late court must set aside its sentence and modify or remand
112
Since the weight that can be attributed to these circumstances depends on
the theory of punishment invoked, this emphasis will vary widely in
accordance with the type of crime committed." 3
(a) Rational basis v. type of crime committed.-When confronted
with a crime against the person, appellate tribunals have placed great
emphasis on the circumstances of the offense in reviewing the propriety
of the punishment. In Commonwealth v. Pouls," 4 for example, the
superior court vacated a sentence of seven and one-half to fifteen years
imposed on a seventeen-year-old rape offender with no prior record.
Without minimizing the serious nature of the appellant's of-
fense, we cannot overlook the fact that the criminal dockets are
filled with records of rapes committed by more mature men,
with criminal records, who, with more determined resistance by
the victim, used much greater force. The defendant's conduct
was reprehensible, but he can hardly be characterized as one of
the most vicious rapists known to the law."1
5
If the chief sentencing objective in Pouls was deterrence, it could hardly
be concluded that the sentence was manifestly excessive. The court was
obviously concerned, as it is when reviewing sentences for other crimes
against the person, 16 with the retributive theory of punishment-to what
112. Mueller, supra note 13, at 687 (emphasis added). See also H. &J. KERPER, LFGAI.
RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED 102 (1974).
113. In his classic commentary on sentencing review, Hall has set forth the following
general observations about how the theories of punishment may differ with respect to the
type of crime committed:
(1) Crimes against the person are punished in such a manner as will most
nearly satisfy the emotional reactions of the community to the crime.
(2) Crimes solely against property and involving more than a slight amount
are punished in a manner as will, primarily, guard against repetition by the
defendant.
(3) Crimes against property involving personal injury are punished on an
emotional basis.
(4) The deterrent element tends to become more important in crimes not
involving the person or property.
Hall, supra note 6, at 529, 538, 543, 544. Unfortunately, most appellate tribunals do not
reflect these sentencing principles explicitly, so that one "must read the thoughts between
the lines of appellate opinions in order to gain an accurate and complete view of the judge's
penal philosophies." Mueller, supra note 13, at 672; accord, Hall, supra note 6, at 529. But
cf. Commonwealth v. Ritter, 13 Pa. D. & C. 285 (0. & T. Phila. 1930) (court explicitly
considers theories of punishment as they relate to offense committed).
114. 198 Pa. Super. Ct. 595, 182 A.2d 261 (1962).
115. Id. at 603, 182 A.2d at 264.
116. See Brief for Appellee at 9, Commonwealth v. Carmichael, - Pa.-, 364 A.2d 305
(1976) (defendant not remorseful for violently taking another's life); Commonwealth v.
Ware, 453 Pa. 15, 307 A.2d 840 (1973) (two to five year sentence for manslaughter after
extent should this defendant be punished for this act? This concern is
shared by the legislature, which has established categories of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances to aid the sentencing court in determining
whether to impose the death penalty or life imprisonment for capital
offenses" 7 and has provided for automatic review by the supreme court
upon imposition of the death penalty."'
Conversely, when the reviewing court is confronted with a crime
that is directed at neither persons nor property, such as a drug offense, its
emphasis on deterrence becomes more significant as the circumstances of
the crime and the criminal correspondingly decrease in importance. " 9 In
Commonwealth v. Badger,2 ° the sentencing court imposed a five to
twelve year sentence on the defendant for a heroin sale, but noted in
retrospect,
[W]hen compared to the [co-defendant's] sentences, I must
acknowledge that there is an element of inequity. Miss Badger
was by far the youngest participant, had no significant criminal
record when compared to her co-conspirators, and in all likeli-
hood would not have an offense of this seriousness had it not
been for her association with [one of the co-defendants] ....
[lilt would appear to me that a sentence of not less than three
nor more than ten years would have been more appropriate.' 2 '
Despite the sentencing judge's own admission that the punishment was
unfair, the superior court refused to modify the sentence for the purported
reasons that (1) the trial court's discretion must be evaluated with respect
to the time it is exercised and (2) the defendant could seek relief through a
pardons or commutations board. 1
22
The court's reasoning is less than compelling. The contention that
the sentencing tribunal's discretion can be examined only at the time it is
exercised is inconsistent with the doctrine that requires the trial judge to
reconsider a sentence if it is based in part upon a prior conviction that is
later nullified. 23 In both of these situations the sentence is deemed unfair
only by hindsight. Moreover, if resort to the executive branch could have
been successful, the defendant would probably not have appealed to the
superior court. 
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violent quarrel in speakeasy not austere, unrealistic, or cruel); Commonwealth v. Howard,
426 Pa. 305, 231 A.2d 860 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 911 (death penalty in exchange for
unprovoked murder of prison guard); Commonwealth v. Washington, 228 Pa. Super. Ct.
175, 323 A.2d 380 (1974) (seventeen year old defendant sentenced ten to twenty years for
armed robbery that court characterizes as vicious).
117. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1311(d) (Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
118. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1311(g) (Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
119. But they do not vanish from the court's eyes. See notes 142-47 and accompanying
text infra.
120. 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 284, 357 A.2d 547 (1976).
121. Id. at 287-88 n.I, 357 A.2d at 548 n.1 (emphasis deleted from original). The trial
court could not reconsider the sentence because more than thirty days had passed since its
original imposition.
122. Id.
123. See notes 86-92 and accompanying text supra.
124. Judge Spaeth, dissenting in Commonwealth v. Riggins, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 32, 332
The result in Badger can be justified only by concluding that the
superior court was implementing a general policy of deterrence for the
particular type of crime involved.125 A close examination of the facts,
however, indicates that the punishment imposed would not have signifi-
cantly served the objectives of deterrence "because offenses of this
nature are not the result of calm and thoughtful planning or of rationalized
deliberation." ' 26 If the superior court had instead begun by examining the
circumstances of the case in relation to the proper objective of punish-
ment, it would have both furthered justice and established a general
sentencing policy that could serve as guidance for lower courts. Further-
more, if the trial judge had not deferred rationalization of the sentence
until after its imposition, it is very likely that only then would the
punishment be fair at the time it was rendered.
12 7
(b) Rational basis v. preconceived policy of the sentencing tribun-
al.-Existing Pennsylvania law requires that when a sentence is ap-
pealed, the sentencing court must provide a brief explanation for the
punishment rendered. 128 In practice this requirement may not be very
useful, given the ability of most judges to invent convincing rationaliza-
tions. 129 Moreover, the court is rarely candid enough to explicitly articu-
late the reasons that justify the sentence at the time it is imposed. 1
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A.2d 521 (1974), rev'd, - Pa. -, 377 A.2d 140 (1977), observed that experience has shown
that "resort to the executive branch . . . is not effective. To be effective, review must be on
a formal and regularized basis." Id. at 44, 332 A.2d at 527. See also Comment, Appellate
Review of Sentences: A Survey, 17 ST. Louis U.L.J. 221, 246 (1972). It has been further
observed by the REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMIrrEE OF PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION that
"[tlhe whole tradition of Anglo-American law which places more reliance and more dignity
on decisions taken on such questions by courts rather than by executive or administrative
boards indicates that it would be better to leave this function in the hands of the court." S.
TOLl., supra note 75, at 33.
125. See also Commonwealth v. Stone, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 24, 323 A.2d 184 (1974), in
which a defendant who had previously arranged to receive an air express delivery of six
pounds of marijuana had a change of heart, turned himself in to the authorities, and pleaded
guilty to the crime. He was sentenced to a two to five year term. If the court's concern was
rehabilitation or retribution, the defendant would probably have been placed on probation.
Instead, the court was obviously concerned with deterrence.
126. Commonwealth v. Ritter, 13 Pa. D. & C. 285, 292-93 (C.P. Phila. 1930).
127. See notes 128-35 and accompanying text infra.
128. PA. R. App. P. 1925. See also Commonwealth v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 514, 161
A. 733, 735 (1932) (trial court must file brief statement of reasons for sentence imposed);
accord Commonwealth v. Riggins, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 32, 47, 332 A.2d 521, 529 (1974)
(Spaeth, J., dissenting).
129. "Actually what I think you'll get is the best rationalizations in the world for almost
anything if they think about it awhile. [The judge's] published statements will soon be
no more than a pious stereotyped form." Symposium, Appellate Review of Sentences, 32
F.R.D. 249, 284 (1962) (remarks of Walsh, J.); see Weigel, Appellate Revision of Sentences:
To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, 20 STAN. L. REV. 405, 420-21 (1968).
130. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bethea, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 366 A.2d 262, 264-65
(1976) rev'd, - Pa. -, - A.2d - (1977); Commonwealth v. Staley, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 322,
323, 324 A.2d 393 (1974). Perhaps the most notable case in which a judge revealed his inner
disposition is United States v. Berger, 255 U.S. 22 (1921), in which trial judge stated of those
accused of espionage, "One must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not be to tsic]
prejudiced against the German Americans in this country. . . .I know a safeblower, he is a
friend of mine, .... and as between him and this defendant, I prefer the safeblower." Id. at
28-29.
To remedy this situation, the ABA has proposed that the sentencing
jurist justify whatever action he takes on the record "in the presence of
the defendant at the time of the sentence." 31 This proposal has recently
been adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
Riggins,132 and is amply justified by Justice Roberts as follows:
[R]equiring the trial court to articulate its reasons for selecting a
sentence will promote more thoughtful consideration of rele-
vant factors and will help rationalize the sentencing process. It
will safeguard against arbitrary decisions and prevent con-
sideration of improper and irrelevant factors. It will minimize
the risk of reliance upon inaccurate information contained in
the presentence report. A statement of reasons may aid correc-
tion authorities if the sentence results in a commitment, and
may have therapeutic value if the sentencing judge explains his
or her reasons to the defendant. Requiring a trial court to
provide a reasoned basis for the sentence imposed may enhance
the court's legitimacy as perceived by judges themselves and
participants in the criminal justice system. It will aid courts in
attaining their institutional objective of dispensing equal and
impartial justice and will demonstrate to society that these goals
are being met. Reasoned sentencing decisions may encourage
the development of sentencing criteria and reduce disparity in
sentences-decreasing the number of unusually lenient as well
as unusually harsh sentences. Finally, a statement of reasons
will be invaluable in aiding appellate courts to ascertain whether
the sentence imposed was based upon accurate, sufficient and
proper information.
133
Without this requirement, it becomes all "too likely that the judge, not
expected to explain, has never organized a full and coherent explanation
even for himself."" 3 Because of this requirement, however, appellate
tribunals can meaningfully analyze each sentence to determine whether it
comports with their own sentencing policies. 1
35
131. ABA SENTENCE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 3, § 2.3(c) at 42 (emphasis
added), cited with approval in Commonwealth v. Riggins, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 32, 47, 332
A.2d 521, 529 (1974) (Spaeth, J., dissenting), rev'd, - Pa. -, 377 A.2d 140 (1977).
132. - Pa. -, 377 A.2d 140 (1977). See also McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 182
N.W.2d 512 (1971) (fundamental principal of Anglo-American jurisprudence is that a judge
must explain the reasons for his actions).
It is noteworthy that Riggins was decided subsequent to two legislative expressions of
horror at Pennsylvania's indeterminate system of sentencing. See notes 174-88 and accom-
panying text infra. Thus, the Riggins rule may be a judicial indication of willingness to more
expressly monitor the trial judge's sentencing discretion.
133. - Pa. - at -, 377 A.2d 140.
134. Frankel, supra note 18, at 10. One of the most compelling arguments against
sentencing review is that the trial judge is the one who has the best opportunity to observe
and confront the defendant, see, e.g, Hopkins, Reviewing Sentencing Discretion: A Method
of Swift Appellate Action, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 491, 492-93 (1976). These judges, however,
remain strangely mute in explaining their penal actions.
The trial court's sensitivity to--and natural desire to avoid-professional reversal
is the direct counterpart of efforts by Skinner's rats and pigeons to escape the
pain of electrically induced shock. While such judicial avoidance of reversal and
public criticism may be considerably more complex than the behavior of labora-
tory animals . . . , the basic principles that underlie the pecking order in both
species are not.
Robin, Judicial Resistance to Sentencing Accountability, 21 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 201,
206 (1975).
135. See Kaufman, The Sentencing Process and Judicial Inscrutibility, 49 ST. JOHN'S
2. The Sentence's Potential for Disparity.-A mere difference in
the punishments prescribed for different individuals convicted of the
same crime does not conclusively establish the existence of sentencing
unfairness.'36 Thus, it is rather difficult to demonstrate statistically that
sentencing disparity even exists.' 3 7 Few 38 would deny, however, that
given the continued commitment to indeterminate sentencing,"and as
long as the [sentencing] decisions are made by humans with inherent
limitations and built-in life experiences, variations based upon the same
set of facts are unavoidable ..... ,39 Difficulties of proof have limited
the finding of sentencing disparity to two clearly indentifiable situations:
when offenders mechanically receive identical sentences for crimes com-
mitted under widely diverse circumstances' 40 and when a defendant who
has the temerity to demand a trial receives an enhanced sentence for the
express reason that he refused to plead guilty.141
(a) Disparity through facial equality.-In what was probably a
conscientious effort to eliminate the vagaries in the sentencing process,
three Lancaster County judges met and determined the punishment they
would thereafter prescribe for various drug offenses without regard to the
defendants' individual characteristics. 42 Since the chief objective of the
mechanical sanctions imposed would be deterrence, 43 it is arguable that
L. Rhv. 215, 221 (1975); Kutak & Gottschalk, In Search ofa Rational Sentence: A Return to
the Concept of Appellate Review, 53 NEB. L. REV. 463, 499 (1974). But see Commonwealth
v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 138, 351 A.2d 650, 666 (1976) (Nix, J., dissenting)-
136. Commonwealth v. Burton, 451 Pa. 12, 301 A.2d 675 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Riggins, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 32, 332 A.2d 521 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, - Pa. -, 377
A.2d 140 (1977); Commonwealth v. Bilinski, 190 Pa. Super. Ct. 401, 154 A.2d 322 (1959);
Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 101 Pa. Super. Ct. 308 (1931).
137. Sentencing disparity is not evinced by the variations in punishment imposed for
the same offense, but by the attitude of the responsible jurist. See, e.g, Cook, Sentencing
Behavior of Federal Judges: Draft Cases - 1972, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 597 (1973).
138. Brewster, for instance, apparently thinks the sentencing judge can do no wrong.
Where are these 'purple, pickled people eaters' among the trial judges who are
waiting to whet appetites on the liberty of human beings? We . . .never see any
of them in person. I think that one of the great dangers to society today is this
propaganda being spread so generally.
Brewster, Appellate Review of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 79, 83-84 (1966). Even if one agrees
with this assessment, one sentencing judge honestly following his own theories of punish-
ment may impose an entirely different sentence than another judge who is honestly follow-
ing another penal philosophy.
139. Berger, Equal Protection and Criminal Sentencing: Legal and Policy Considera-
tions, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 29, 35 (1976).
140. See notes 142-47 and accompanying text infra.
141. See notes 148-59 and accompanying text infra.
142. The court in Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 351 A.2d 650 (1976), accept-
ed, on the basis of a quotation taken from a newspaper article, the contention that the judges
had conferred prior to imposition of sentence. Brief for Appellee at 4-5. Nevertheless, the
court may have had judicial notice of this practice because one of the judges in Martin
wrote to a defendant in an unrelated case that "the invariable policy of the Lancaster
County Court is to impose a . .. $200 fine, costs of prosecution, and three months in
Lancaster County Prison on all second offenders charged with operating a motor vehicle
under the influence of intoxicating liquor." Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 446 Pa. 35, 37, 285
A.2d 465, 466 (1971) (emphasis added).
143. See notes 126-28 and accompanying text supra.
the circumstances of the act and the character of actor would be immate-
rial. Nevertheless, the supreme court in Commonwealth v. Martin
144
rejected this practice because it openly defied the concept of an indetermi-
nate sentence prescribed by the legislature. 145 It can be further observed
that the theory of deterrence would not be served by this practice.
[T]he same severity of sentence is not necessary to deter every-
one. Non-hardened criminals in the community may be deterr-
ed from crime by a particular sentence, whereas a more hard-
ened offender may require a greater sentence to deter him and
those similar to him. . . .Thus, while deterrence may be a
factor in sentencing, it alone cannot support mechanical sen-
tencing. 146
Thus, the defendant will succeed in demonstrating sentencing disparity if
he can show the appellate court that he and other defendants have
received identical sentences for the commission of crimes under widely
varying circumstances. 14 7 The defendant who hopes to show guilty plea
disparity, however, has a much heavier burden.
(b) Guilty plea disparity.-Few would deny that the defendant
who pleads guilty will receive a lighter sentence than one who refuses to
waive his constitutional right to a trial. 14 8 But this alone does not indicate
whether the court is using its "sentencing power as a carrot and stick to
clear congested calendars"1 49 or is merely showing leniency to a defend-
ant who by admitting his guilt has taken the first step toward rehabilita-
tion. 15 This determination can be made only by examining the record;
but even though the jurist is now required to explain his sentence at the
time it is imposed,' 5 ' "[s]uch reasons become part of the record only if
the sentencing judge is unusually frank or if he blunders.'
' 152
144. 466Pa. 118,351 A.2d650(1976).
145. Id. at 130 n.21, 351 A.2d at 656 n.21.
146. Berger, supra nOte 141, at 60-61.
147. In Commonwealth v. Hill, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 543, 353 A.2d 870 (1975), for
example, the superior court vacated the sentence imposed on one of two defendants who
had robbed a grocery store, because the sentencing judge had refused to order a presentence
investigative report. One of the defendants had six prior major convictions, while the
defendant whose sentence was vacated had only one major prior conviction. The court
observed, "We do not suggest that every situation where co-defendants are sentenced will
require proportionment of sentences according to past criminal records; but here the
difference in past criminal records is significant." Id. at 564, 353 A.2d at 882.
148. See generally Ferguson, The Role of the Judge in Plea Bargaining, 15 CRIM. L.Q.
26, 50-51 (1972).
149. United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186, 1187 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
948 (1973).
150. Id. See also United States v. Von Der Heide, 169 F. Supp. 560 (D.D.C. 1959). The
logical basis of this assumption is fragile, since "with the inducement of a lighter sentence
dangled before [the defendant], the sincerity of any cries of mea culpa becomes question-
able. . . .[A] colorable argument can be made that a glib willingness to admit guilt in order
to secure something in return may indicate quite the opposite of repentance." Scott v.
United States, 419 F.2d 264, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cited with approval in Commonwealth v.
Staley, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 322, 325, 324 A.2d 393, 395 (1974).
151. See notes 128-136 and accompanying text supra.
152. Note, Appellate Review of Sentences and the Need For a Reviewable Record, 1973
DUKE L.J. 1357, 1375.
Thus, it is not surprising that the superior court has confronted
questionable remarks by the sentencing jurist on only the two following
occasions:
I. I am disposed to give [the defendant] a larger minimum
in this case because it was a trial .
5 3
2. [H]ad you plead guilty it might have shown me the
right side of your attitude about this, but you pled not guilty,
fought it all the way, . and I'm going to sentence you at this
time. 
14
In both instances it is apparent that the refusal to admit guilt was relevant
to the sentencing decision, and in the first situation the sentence was
vacated for that very reason. 55 But in the second situation, the superior
court inconsistently affirmed the sentence because the trial court had
studied "all relevant factors" before determining the penalty.
15 6
A defendant's refusal to plead guilty cannot conscionably be con-
doned as a matter that the sentencing judge can expressly consider in
determining the appropriate disposition. Not only does it result in a
"chilling effect" on the exercise of basic constitutional rights, 15 7 but it
also ignores the very concept of an adversary process in which contrition
comes only after trial158 and contradicts the requirement that a court avoid
even the appearance of impropriety. 5 9 It is sad enough that courts of
review usually have no tangible basis to curb guilty plea disparity, but
their refusal to lash out at such injustice when it is literally before their
eyes is nothing less than a sheer abdication of judicial responsibility.
Thus, it is not surprising that the supreme court recently reversed the
superior court's decision in the second situation. 159a "
The problems resulting from unfairness in sentencing have not gone
unnoticed. One renowned commentator warned as long ago as 1937 that
the victims of severe measures can hardly be expected to feel
that they have had just treatment when they contemplate others
153. Commonwealth v. Staley, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 322, 324, 324 A.2d 393, 394 (1974).
154. Commonwealth v. Bethea, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 366 A.2d 262, 264 (1976),
rev'd, - Pa. -, - A.2d - (1977).
155. "A plea of not guilty or a demand for a jury trial are not factors that a judge should
consider in deciding whether to give a more severe sentence." Commonwealth v. Staley,
229 Pa. Super. Ct. 322, 324, 324 A.2d 393, 395 (1974).
156. The relevant factors that the trial judge considered are reflected by the following
remark:
I didn't give you the maximum because of your age and the fact that you had a
good prior record, but because of the seriousness of this crime [an armed robbery
involving a shoot-out] and the ever present threat of robberies in this city, which
have been occurring here for several years, we are going to serve notice by this
case that that sort of thing isn't going to be tolerated.
Commonwealth v. Bethea, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 366 A.2d 262, 265 (1976). Judge Spaeth,
dissenting, observed that a judge should "be held to mean what he says." Id. at -, 366 A.2d
at 266.
157. See, e.g., United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 948 (1973).
158. Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 270 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
159. PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CANON 2.
159-1 Commonwealth v. Bethea, - Pa- -, - A-2d - (1977).
equally guilty who have escaped lightly. It is a short step from
resentment to rebellion, which if concealed prevents reforma-
tion, and if overt, may lead to prison riots and insurrections.
16
0
Forty years later, not only has this prophecy been fulfilled, 16 1 but other
distortions in criminal justice have resulted, such as judge-shopping or
strained interpretation of substantive law to prevent imposition of an
unduly harsh sentence.' 6 2 But the chief cause of both sentencing disparity
and irrationality-the "substantially unbounded discretion" of the sen-
tencing tribunal163 -has gone unchecked by appellate review. This has
left the legislature with two alternatives: it must either strengthen the
mechanism of existing review procedures 164 or return once again to the
specter of determinate sentencing. 1
6 5
IV. Sentencing Reforms
A. Improved Sentencing Review Procedure
The unquestionably heavy workload that confronts the superior
court' 6 6 could arguably be increased even further if the court dared signal
willingness to examine more explicitly the substantive fairness of crimin-
al sentences. This floodgates argument,' 67 however, can be answered by
streamlining the appellate machinery when the only issue on appeal is the
validity of the sentence 168 and by creating a sentencing commission to
promulgate guidelines that assist lower courts in pronouncing
sentences. 1
69
160. Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentence on Appeal (part 2), 37 COLUM. L. REV. 762,
763 (1937).
161. The Attica Commission concluded that the chief cause of the September 1971
uprising at the Attica Correctional Center was unequal treatment in the sentencing process.
McKay, It's Time to Rehabilitate the Sentencing Process, 60 JUD. 223, 226 (1976).
162. Berger, supra note 141, at 60-61. See also Commonwealth v. Riggins, 232 Pa.
Super. Ct. 32, 332 A.2d 521, 528 n.4 (1974) (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
163. Frankel, supra note 18, at 7.
164. See notes 166-81 and accompanying text infra.
165. See notes 182-88 and accompanying text infra.
166. Former Chief Justice Jones revealed that the superior court faced an onerous task
in -1975.
[O]ver 2,900 appeals were filed and over 5,400 miscellaneous petitions presented.
That Court heard oral argument in 852 cases and had 939 cases submitted on briefs
and filed over 1,300 opinions. The mere recitation of these figures indicates the
incredible workload of the seven hard-working judges of that Court.
Jones, The State of the Judiciary in the Commonwealth, 47 PA. B.A.Q. 478, 483 (1976).
167. Judge Spaeth finds the floodgates argument
both unpersuasive and distasteful. It is unpersuasive because the inducement to
appeal is already so strong it cannot be made much stronger: most criminal
defendants are represented by the Public Defender and have nothing to lose by
instructing the Defender to appeal; especially will this instruction be given where
the sentence is felt to be excessive. It is distasteful because it 'completely evades
the issue of whether an appeals procedure is needed to insure the quality of justice
that should characterize our courts.'
Commonwealth v. Riggins, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 32, 45 n.4, 332 A.2d 521, 528 n.4 (1974)
(dissenting opinion). It is noteworthy that Alaska, a state that explicitly provides for
sentence review, heard only sixty sentence appeals between January 1, 1970.and July 1,
1975. Erwin, Five Years of Sentence Review in Alaska, 5 U.C.L.A. ALAS. L. REv. 1,3 n.12
(1975).
168. See notes 171-74 and accompanying text infra.
169. See notes 175-82 and accompanying text infra.
I. Streamlining the Sentence Review Machinery.-The supreme
court has recently determined that the superior court may meet in three-
judge panels. 170 This type of procedure may not be profitable for all
appeals, but it should certainly be an expeditious solution to petitions for
review based solely on the procedural or substantive fairness of the
sentence. Other internal functions of the sppellate tribunal could be
simplified by adopting the New York procedure, 17' which has been
described by one jurist as follows:
The motion papers, the record and the presentence report are
submitted to a panel of five judges without argument; as a
matter of practice, the appeal is assigned to one of the members
of the panel to report. Customarily, the judge circulates the
report within a week to the other members of the panel. That
report describes the details of the crime, the essential charac-
teristics of the defendant, the attitude of the sentencing judge,
and the recommendations and observations of the probation
department stated in the presentence report. The judge con-
cludes the report with his own comments and recommenda-
tions.
The other members of the panel receive the report with a
voting slip attached. In the event that all four remaining mem-
bers of the panel concur with the recommended disposition of
the appeal, a decision is handed down within a week. [If not,
the appeal is determined at the next consultation, which is held
once a week]. 1 2
Since swift punishment is an essential predicate to successful deter-
rence, 73 implementation of such a procedure in Pennsylvania would be
advantageous to society as well as the defendant. These procedures,
however, will not benefit the trial courts unless appellate courts offer
reasoned opinions to support their decisions. This objective can be at-
tained by the creation of a sentencing commission.
2. The Sentencing Commission as an Aid to Sentence Review.-
There are legislative proposals on both the federal' 74 and common-
wealth' 75 levels to establish sentencing commissions whose chief func-
tion would be to promulgate sentencing guidelines. 76 Such a commission
170. PA. R. App. P. 3102. The Advisory Committee explained that "the Rule does not
require the Superior Court to sit in panels; it merely makes three judges a quorum of the
court. Hence, the way is open to the Superior Court to adopt the panel at its option." 461 Pa.
xxix, xxiv (1976).
171. N.Y. CODE OF RULES & REGULATIONS, tit. 22, § 670.17 (1974).
172. Hopkins, supra note 134, at 497.
173. McKay, supra note 161, at 225.
174. S. 204, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
175. Pa. H.R. 196, 160th Sess. (1977); Pa. S. 639, 160th Sess. (1977).
176. S. 204, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 5(a), 6-10 (1977); Pa. H.R. 199, 160th Sess., §
2(a)(b) (1977). Pa. S. 639, 160th Sess., § 3 (1977). The federal statute provides that the
commission's guidelines shall include presumptive sentences that may be increased toward
the maximum or decreased toward the minimum for diverse aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. This would force the commission to formulate a sentencing rationale. Critics
contend that the mere establishment of guidelines
could significantly assist the appellate tribunal, since "[t]he more uncer-
tain the appellate court is about the objectives of punishment and their
application to a particular offender, the greater the likelihood that the
court will feel obliged to defer to the trial judge's discretion."' 177 The
penal standards that will inevitably be articulated should also bolster trial
judges who, in an attempt to sentence fairly, are confronted with conflict-
ing considerations. "The victim wants revenge; the wife [of the offender]
wants leniency; the district attorney wants punishment; the defendant
wants mercy; [and] society wants justice.'
' 78
Although creation of a sentencing commission would not of itself
result in crime reduction,' 79 it should at least offer a compromise between
"unreasoned, guesswork indeterminate sentencing" and "mechanical
and inhuman mandatory sentencing."" ° The implementation of sentenc-
ing standards would also reflect appreciation of the supreme court's
concern in Commonwealth v. Martin that the circumstances of the act and
the character of the actor be considered in every case' 8' and that a
structure be maintained within which the sentencing court can express
that concern.
B. Return to the Determinate Sentence
Another suggested solution to the problems of disparity and irration-
ality in sentencing is a return to the determinate sentence.' 82 The Pennsyl-
vania proposal 8 3  prescribes mandatory minimum sentences for
enumerated felonies and increases both the minimum and the maximum
that may be imposed for subsequent offenses. 18' For fourth and subse-
would only do half the job. There is wide disagreement in the criminal justice
community about whether imprisonment is intended to punish, protect law abid-
ing citizens, rehabilitate criminals or to establish a combination of these goals.
Any new sentencing program which does not address itself to those uncertainties
is apt ultimately to lapse into the confusion born of the absence of an intellectual
core.
CONG. REC. 555 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Hart).
177. D'Esposito, Sentencing Disparity: Causes and Cures, 60 J. CRIM. L.G. & P.S. 182,
190 (1969).
178. Coburn, Disparity in Sentences and Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25 RUTGERS
L. REV. 207, 208 (1971) (quoting McKesson, Human Salvage, 9 CALIF. YOUTH AUTH. Q. 3
(1956)).
179. See generally CONG. REC. 555 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Hart);
McKay, supra note 163 at 228.
180. PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY & PENNSYLVANIA JOINT COUNCIL ON CRIMIN-
AL JUSTICE, PENNSYLVANIA SENTENCE CONFERENCE 140-41 (1977) (remarks of.Judge Critelli)
[hereinafter cited as PA. SENTENCING CONFERENCE].
181. See notes 143-46 supra.
182. The term "determinate sentence" is used to include flattime punishment (one
inflexible sentence for every offense), mandatory minimum sentences, and definite sen-
tences (imprisonment defined within narrow sentencing range, but with many sentencing
alternatives, e.g., restitution, probation, partial confinement, diversion). See COUNCIL ON
DEFINITE SENTENCING, supra note 13, at 13.
183. Pa. S. 995, 160th Sess. (1976).
184. Id. at § 1501. Second offenders must be sentenced to a minimum of one year or to
a maximum of twice the sentence authorized by law for the offense. The enumerated
felonies include murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,
quent offenders, the sentencing court would be permitted to sentence the
defendant to life imprisonment or a two year minimum. 185
Little can be said for this proposal. First, it expands rather than
eliminates the potential for disparity and irrationality in sentencing by
increasing the range of sentencing alternatives. Second, since a guilty
plea would become less advantageous, there would be "more trials, more
delays, much more work for prosecutors and judges, more imprisonment
and detention, and possibly more acquittals."' 186 Thus, the costs of
implementing this concept in Pennsylvania have been conservatively
estimated at somewhere between 28.8 million and 92.7 million dollars. 
187
Last, there is evidence that mandatory minimum sentences simply would
not work.
In Massachusetts, for example, judges have contrived reasons
for freeing otherwise 'law-abiding' citizens who have run afoul
of the one-year gun control law. As one criminal lawyer put it:
'Judges who had never before heard of the Constitution are
now declaring searches to be illegal every time a gun is found in
a white man's suit jacket.' In states that have adopted manda-
tory death sentences for murder, prosecutors are reducing
charges, and juries are returning 'manslaughter' verdicts in
cases where the death penalty is deemed inappropriate.18
It would hardly make sense to enact a sentencing statute that juries,
judiciary, and even prosecutors would seek desperately to evade.
C. Enhanced Sentences on Appeal
Both the mandatory minimum sentence' 89 and the sentence commis-
sion' 90 proposals permit the Commonwealth to seek increased sentences
through the superior court. The argument in favor of vesting an appellate
tribunal with the power to increase sentences is that
the goal in the matter of sentencing ought to be, as it is in the
case of many exceptions to the right to appeal, to get a decision
at a level where justice is most likely to be done. If this particu-
lar argument is really supported by principle, why do so many
rape, -burglary, robbery, arson, aggravated assault, kidnapping, sale of narcotics, or any
felony or attempted felony that entails the use of a firearm.
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of its proponents oppose giving the appellate court the power to
increase as well as decrease the sentence? 91
Whether an appellate court may constitutionally increase a sentence on
appeal, however, must be considered with reference to the party appe-
aling.
I. Appeal by Commonwealth.-Present Pennsylvania law pro-
hibits the Commonwealth from appealing for sentence increases unless
there is a pure issue of law.' 92 This doctrine of nonreview emanates from
"the common-law rule that the State could not sue out a writ of error
unless the legislature had expressly granted it that right." 193 Since these
proposed statutes expressly confer upon the Commonwealth the right to
appeal the propriety of sentences, it is arguable that the common-law
proscription must give way. But as this barrier falls, the hurdle of double
jeopardy arises.' 94
In United States v. Jenkins,195 the United States Supreme Court
announced that government appeals are not barred by the double jeopardy
clause unless "further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution
of factual issues going to the element of the offense charged, would [be]
required on reversal and remand."91 This holding indicates that a gov-
ernment appeal for an increased sentence would result in multiple punish-
ment for the same offense, since such an appeal would require the
resolution of what are essentially factual issues concerning the propriety
of the sentence. 1
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The double jeopardy clause is directed against the danger of
manipulative practices by the government, whether in the form of multi-
ple prosecution' 98 or multiple punishment."9 It is difficult to conceive of
a situation more pregnant with the threat of oppression than when a
disgruntled prosecutor exposes the already convicted and sentenced de-
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fendant to the possibility of a greater sentence. No government should be
entrusted with that power.
200
2. Appeal by Defendant.-The fear of prosecutorial harassment,
however, is eliminated when it is the defendant who appeals. The Su-
preme Court has suggested that a sentencing judge may impose a more
severe sentence when a defendant is retried after the reversal of a previous
conviction, as long as the increased sanction results from "objective
information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant
occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding."- 20 1 In
such a case the accused is not subjected to double jeopardy, since by
appealing the sentence he voluntarily assumes the risk of a new trial and
all the attending repercussions.
20 2
Similarly, a defendant who seeks a reduced sentence voluntarily
assumes the risk that the appellate court will consider matters other than
those considered by the court below. This may result in an increase rather
than a reduction in sentence. 203There is little danger that allowing such
increases would have a "chilling effect" on the defendant's exercise of
his right to review, 2°4 because "[i]f such review were to occur upon the
defendant's initiative, he would be represented by counsel both in making
that decision and in pursuing the appeal; by such representation, the
hazards would be largely overcome. "205 The power to increase sentences
should inure to the benefit of defendants as well as society, because if
appellate courts could employ their review powers to increase as well as
decrease sentences, they might finally demonstrate greater willingness to
scrutinize the substantive fairness of the sentence imposed.
V. Conclusion
The existence of these proposed sentencing reforms, if nothing else,
indicates that Pennsylvania's higher tribunals have failed to assure either
procedural or substantive fairness in sentencing. By refusing to permit
defendant's counsel to perform some of the functions that justify his
presence and by failing to prevent the trial judge from inferring guilt on
200. If the government could be trusted there would be no need for a constitution much
less a double jeopardy clause. But this does not mean that the sovereign should be pro-
hibited from expressing disapproval of an arbitrarily permissive sentence. In Alaska, for
example, the pertinent statute provides in part as follows: "'[W]hen a sentence is appealed
by the state and the defendant has not appealed the sentence, the court is not authorized to
increase the sentence but may express its approval or disapproval of the sentence and its
reasons in a written opinion." ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120(b) (1976).
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the basis of mere arrests and even acquittals, appellate courts have
effectively nullified the advantage of any procedural guarantees extended
to the defendant during the sentencing stage. Furthermore, to the extent
that review of the propriety of sentences exists at all, it rarely goes
beyond the timid statement that this sentence is manifestly excessive or
that sentence is not. The trial jurist is given no guiding principles with
which to formulate future sanction.
Appellate courts have not hesitated to protect the fundamental right
to vote, 2°6 to procreate, 2° 7 and to travel from one state to another. 20 8 Yet,
these same courts have been curiously reluctant to exercise their powers
when criminal defendants, by being imprisoned, are effectively deprived
of all three of these rights. Consistency, as well as justice, demands that a
defendant be afforded the right to have his sentence based upon both
proper information and a uniform penal policy.
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